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INTRODUCTION

H

OW did you stumble across this Note, and what does that say about
you? What words you queried, how quickly you typed them, the
websites you recently visited, and your current geographic location are
all useful data points that can be aggregated to form an informative picture of who you are and what you have done. 1
Companies such as Google collect this data because it can be analyzed for patterns that can predict your future acts. 2 This predictive ability is useful to both a salesman predicting when you might purchase
your next pair of shoes, 3 as well as an FBI agent predicting when you
may perform your next act of terrorism. 4 By collecting vast amounts of
data, commonly referred to as “big data,” predictions can be exponentially more accurate than ever before. 5 In addition to predicting what you
may do, analyzing big data allows for a more detailed depiction of what
you have already done. 6 It is this backwards-looking feature of big data
that this Note will address.
When government investigators request data from companies such as
Google, they obtain data on targeted individuals with a guarantee that
the data has been collected, stored, and analyzed properly. These guarantees constitute a testimonial statement under the Confrontation
Clause. 7 Similar to lab analysts who submit test results of cocaine sam1
See Privacy Policy, Google, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy (last visited
Aug. 23, 2015) (explaining the type of data Google collects).
2
Phil Simon, Too Big to Ignore: The Business Case for Big Data 101–02 (2013).
3
See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think 51–52 (2013) [hereinafter Mayer-Schönberger
& Cukier, Big Data].
4
See Byron Acohido, Watch Out, Terrorists: Big Data Is on the Case, USA Today (July 29,
2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/07/29/criminals-terrorists-leavetracks-in-big-data/2596713.
5
Patrick Tucker, The Naked Future: What Happens in a World that Anticipates Your Every Move?, at xv (2014) (“[S]ystems are developing perceptions that far exceed our own.”).
6
Soumendra Mohanty, Madhu Jagadeesh & Harsha Srivatsa, Big Data Imperatives: Enterprise ‘Big Data’ Warehouse, ‘BI’ Implementations and Analytics 15–16 (2013).
7
See infra Part III.
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ples 8 or blood alcohol levels, 9 this Note argues that analysts involved
with the collection, storage, and analysis of big data must be available
for confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 10 At least one federal appeals court has adopted a similar view. 11
In addressing the constitutionality of modern government surveillance, this Note examines a growing problem. Much of the contemporary academic debate regarding the constitutionality of government surveillance focuses on the President’s Article II authority and the Fourth
Amendment. 12 Missing from this literature is a detailed discussion of the
Confrontation Clause. This Note fills that void by examining the usefulness of the Confrontation Clause in addressing mass data collection by
the government.
The usefulness of the Confrontation Clause becomes apparent when
one considers the finite ability of the Fourth Amendment to address
government data collection. Every federal appeals court to address the
issue has found that the President possesses the inherent authority to collect data for foreign intelligence purposes without a warrant. 13 The President’s authority to collect data, however, does not provide the govern8

See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
10
See infra Part III.
11
See United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 651–52 (1st Cir. 2012).
12
See, e.g., Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U. Miami L.
Rev. 541 (2008); Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth
Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1809 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 757,
863–97 (2014); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L.
Rev. 311 (2012); Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, 7 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 333 (2014) [hereinafter Vladeck, After Snowden]; John Yoo, The Legality of
the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 10 J.L. & Pol’y for Info.
Soc’y 301, 316–26 (2014) [hereinafter Yoo, Bulk Data]. But see, e.g., Andrew P. Napolitano, A Legal History of National Security Law and Individual Rights in the United States:
The Unconstitutional Expansion of Executive Power, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 396, 460–506
(2014) (discussing the First Amendment); Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article
III: A Surreply to Orin, Lawfare (Aug. 5, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/
08/the-fisa-court-and-article-iii (discussing Article III).
13
See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (recognizing that “all
the other courts to have decided the issue [have] held that the President did have inherent
authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information,” and
thus “tak[ing] for granted that the President does have that authority”); see also United States
v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972) (leaving open the possibility that warrantless surveillance may be constitutional in the foreign intelligence context).
9
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ment with unfettered authority to use the data in a criminal proceeding
against a defendant. 14 When data is presented at trial against a criminal
defendant, the Confrontation Clause is implicated, and the clause’s ability to act as a check on government surveillance comes into focus. 15 This
flexible check on government surveillance can be attained through the
application of contemporary Supreme Court Confrontation Clause doctrine. 16
Many scholars, however, are hesitant to extend the Supreme Court’s
contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine. 17 This Note addresses their
concerns, and explains why the common objections to extending current
14

Yoo, Bulk Data, supra note 12, at 324.
While the word “data” is the plural form of the word “datum,” this Note uses phrases
such as “data is” in an attempt to be less distracting to the reader. Jane Bambauer, Is Data
Speech, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 59 n.3 (2014); Mona Chalabi, ‘Data Is’ vs. ‘Data Are’,
FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 17, 2014, 1:20 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/data-is-vs-dataare.
16
See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Crawford v. Washington: The Next Ten Years, 113 Mich. L. Rev.
First Impressions 9, 12–13 (2014) [hereinafter Fisher, The Next Ten] (acknowledging the
Confrontation Clause’s impact on prosecutors who use testimonial statements in court, as
well as its non-impact on investigators who collect such statements).
17
See, e.g., Brief for Fern L. Nesson & Charles R. Nesson as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 13–17, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352); Jeffrey Bellin,
Applying Crawford’s Confrontation Right in a Digital Age, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 33, 42
(2012) [hereinafter Bellin, Digital Age]; Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1865 (2012) [hereinafter Bellin, Shrinking]; Craig M. Bradley,
Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 315, 315 (2010);
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 105 (2005); Donald A. Dripps,
Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington: Three Constructive Proposals, 7
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 521, 536, 539 (2010); George Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 Mich.
L. Rev. First Impressions 17, 19–25 (2014) [hereinafter Fisher, Debacle]; Joëlle Anne Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause Legacy from Its (Glorious) Beginning to (Bitter) End, 44 Akron L. Rev. 1211, 1248–51, 1255–56 (2011); Robert P. Mosteller,
Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require That
Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & Pol’y 685 (2007); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Confrontation and
the Re-Privatization of Domestic Violence, 113 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 32, 32
(2014); Dylan O. Keenan, Note, Bullcoming and Cold Cases: Reconciling the Confrontation
Clause with DNA Evidence, 30 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. Inter Alia 13 (2012). But see, e.g.,
Fisher, The Next Ten, supra note 16, at 13–15 (outlining “a few things the Court should
do . . . to clarify and solidify Crawford’s exclusionary rule”); Richard D. Friedman, Come
Back to the Boat, Justice Breyer!, 113 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 1, 5–7 (2014) (criticizing efforts to narrow Crawford’s testimonial definition); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 51, 53, 57–80
(2012) [hereinafter Friedman, Round Four] (describing “straightforward” applications of
Crawford).
15
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doctrine do not apply to big data transfers. 18 Moreover, the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Riley v. California 19 provides additional support for treating big data as unique. 20
In Part I, this Note will provide an introduction to big data and the legal authority for its collection by government investigators. Part II will
explain the Supreme Court’s contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine. Part III will present the argument that the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment applies to big data transfers under two independent theories: one theory dealing with individual pieces or small collections of data, and another theory dealing with a novel application of the
Mosaic Theory. Part IV will describe Google’s procedures for answering
government requests for data, and will outline the small number of
Google employees that would be required for confrontation.
I. INTRODUCTION TO BIG DATA
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once observed that “the man of the future
is the man of statistics.” 21 Today society collects data at a level Justice
Holmes might never have imagined. Every day, Google processes thousands of times the amount of data contained in all the printed material in
the U.S. Library of Congress, and the stock of information in the world
doubles about every three years. 22 Though data collection has increased
exponentially since the days of Justice Holmes, the number of predictions derived from data is still “not unmanageably large,” 23 thanks in
part to the use of predictive analytics that can derive valuable insights
from big data. 24

18

See infra Subsection III.D.1.
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
20
See infra Subsection III.D.2.
21
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
22
Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 9.
23
Holmes, supra note 21, at 458.
24
Eric Siegel, Predictive Analytics: The Power to Predict Who Will Click, Buy, Lie, or
Die 4 (2013).
19
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A. What Is Big Data?
There is no uniform definition for big data. 25 For the purposes of this
Note the following definition will suffice: an amount of data so large
that traditional analytical tools must give way to statistical models. 26
Traditional survey methodology consists of collecting data from a representative sample in an attempt to discover something about the relevant
population as a whole. 27 The statistical models used to analyze big data,
by comparison, are “messier” than these traditional models. 28
An example of traditional survey methodology is a farmer who estimates the yield of an entire apple orchard by manually counting apples
on randomly selected trees. Big data works differently By aggregating
large amounts of cheaper—though potentially less correlated—data, one
can create a more accurate picture than may have existed had fewer
pieces of expensive, but more correlated, data been used. 29 For example,
the same farmer might estimate her orchard’s yield by aggregating data
she has already collected for other reasons, such as how much seed was
sown, how many sunny days there have been, and how much fruit various parts of the orchard have produced in the past. 30
Though “messier” data is used, the sheer amount of data compensates
for the shortcoming of each piece of data examined individually. Thus
big data is useful when analyzed collectively, rather than being split into

25

See Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 6; Sharon D. Nelson &
John W. Simek, Big Data: Big Pain or Big Gain for Lawyers?, 39 L. Prac. 24, 24 (2013).
26
See Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 6; see also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 41, 42
(2013) (“[S]mall data inputs are aggregated to produce large datasets which analytic techniques mine for insight.”).
27
See Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 21; see also David A.
Freedman, Sampling, in 1 SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods 986,
986–87 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman & Tim Futing Liao eds., 2004) (explaining
sampling and sample designs).
28
See Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 39.
29
See Greg Satell, Before You Can Manage Big Data, You Must First Understand It, Forbes
(June 22, 2013, 8:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2013/06/22/before-you-canmanage-big-data-you-must-first-understand-it (“By vastly increasing the data we use, we can
incorporate lower quality sources and still be amazingly accurate.”).
30
See Kowligi R. Krishna, Precision Farming: Soil Fertility and Productivity Aspects 29–68
(2013); Dan Charles, Should Farmers Give John Deere and Monsanto Their Data?, NPR (Jan.
22, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/01/21/264577744/should-farmersgive-john-deere-and-monsanto-their-data.
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individual pieces. 31 Analyzing only some hand-selected pieces of data in
a collection and deciding to leave other data out can result in a different
picture than would have existed had all or different pieces of data been
used. 32
Because of advances in technology, it is cheaper than ever to collect,
store, and analyze vast amounts of data. 33 This allows individuals to
seek data that they may never have thought worthwhile to seek before. 34
For example, comparing cereal-purchasing habits to voting habits might
reveal that purchasing a given brand of cereal has a given correlation
with voting for a certain political party. Instead of acquiring data in a
traditional way, such as door-to-door surveying, a campaign manager
may prefer to purchase the “less accurate” cereal data and aggregate it
with other cheap but messy data, such as “Likes” on a candidate’s Facebook page. 35
Similar to the campaign manager, government investigators have
found big data useful in combating terrorism and other criminal acts. 36
The government, however, cannot always know in advance which indi-

31
See Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 13–15, 39; see also Satell,
supra note 29 (“And that’s the beauty of big data, it can be dumb and still be incredibly useful.”).
32
See Problems with Scientific Research: How Science Goes Wrong, Economist (Oct.
19, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21588069-scientific-research-has-changedworld-now-it-needs-change-itself-how-science-goes-wrong (noting that poor research habits,
such as excluding relevant data, can skew results).
33
See Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 15, 83–84, 95 (referring to
digitization and datafication).
34
See Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail—But Some
Don’t 253 (2012) (“[I]t is indeed usually valuable to collect more [data].”).
35
See, e.g., Dan Balz, How the Obama Campaign Won the Race for Voter Data, Wash. Post
(July 28, 2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-obama-campaign-won-the-racefor-voter-data/2013/07/28/ad32c7b4-ee4e-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html. But see Rasmus
Kleis Nielsen & Cristian Vaccari, Do People “Like” Politicians on Facebook? Not Really. LargeScale Direct Candidate-to-Voter Online Communication as an Outlier Phenomenon, 7 Int’l J.
Comm. 2333, 2334 (2013) (suggesting that people pay little attention to politicians on Facebook
and other social media platforms).
36
See, e.g., Jesús Mena, Investigative Data Mining for Security and Criminal Detection 14
(2003) (“The probability of a crime or an attack involves assessing risk, which is the objective of data mining.”); Theresa M. Payton & Theodore Claypoole, Privacy in the Age of Big
Data: Recognizing Threats, Defending Your Rights, and Protecting Your Family 47 (2014)
(explaining how big data “could be used to study patterns for any behavior that might be related to terrorism”).
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viduals in a population are going to be the “bad guys.” 37 This inability
has resulted in widespread intelligence-gathering programs such as
PRISM, a National Security Agency (“NSA”) program that collects data
from the Internet for foreign intelligence purposes. 38 According to information leaked by Edward Snowden, the PRISM program acquires data from several companies including Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. 39
Section I.B will describe how data can be collected from these companies.
B. Methods of Government Data Collection
Google, the paradigmatic data-gathering entity, 40 gets requests for data about its users in several different forms. (Throughout the remainder
of this Note, Google will be used as a representative example of companies similar to Google.) In addition to traditional search warrants and
subpoenas, requests can come in the form of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) request or a National Security Letter (“NSL”). 41
Government investigators may be restricted in the type of request they
can use to collect data about a given suspect. For example, unlike subpoenas “that can be issued in any sort of criminal case, NSLs can only

37
See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework
to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 93, 103–05 (2014) (discussing law
enforcement use of big data).
38
Director of Nat’l Intelligence, Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1 (June 8, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/Facts%20on%20the%20Collection%20of%20Intelligence%20Pursuant%20to
%20Section%20702.pdf; see also Yoo, Bulk Data, supra note 12, at 311–13 (discussing Section
702, under which PRISM is justified).
39
See Napolitano, supra note 12, at 538–40; see also NSA Slides Explain the PRISM DataCollection Program, Wash. Post (June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
special/politics/prism-collection-documents (explaining how PRISM is used to collect data).
40
See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 105, 112 (2010) (describing
how Google has become a “de facto lawmaker” for much of the Internet).
41
See, e.g., Transparency Report, Google, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/user
datarequests/legalprocess/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015); Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Aug.
25, 2015); Transparency Report, Twitter, https://transparency.twitter.com/country/us (last visited Aug. 25, 2015); Transparency Report, Yahoo!, https://transparency.yahoo.com/governmentdata-requests/US-JUL-DEC-2013.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
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be used during duly authorized national security investigations.” 42 Similarly, FISA requests are intended for foreign intelligence gathering. 43
These nuances merely narrow the type of criminal conduct that can be
investigated under different requests, but do not affect whether the data
is sought or provided for the purposes of an ongoing emergency, or to
prove a past event for criminal prosecution.
As will be explained in Part II, whether or not data is sought or provided to prove a past event for criminal prosecution is an important consideration under contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine. It is
therefore significant that after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT
Act 44—in which Congress allowed for more communication between
law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies 45—data can be collected under the authority of a FISA request or NSL even if the primary
purpose of the collection is for criminal prosecution. 46 Similarly, search
warrants and subpoenas can be used when the primary purpose of the
collection is to prove a past event for criminal prosecution. 47
Much of the contemporary literature regarding the legality of modern
government data collection addresses whether agencies such as the NSA
should be subject to domestic criminal justice constraints, requiring
search warrants and subpoenas, or special wartime foreign intelligence
models where surveillance authority is said to derive from the President’s constitutional powers. 48 The role the Confrontation Clause plays
regarding data transferred from Google to government investigators,
however, does not turn on whether a FISA request, NSL, search warrant,
or subpoena is used. In each situation, Google is aware that it is transfer42
Michael German et al., National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigations or
Intrusive Tools?, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t.
43
See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
44
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
45
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 733–34 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
46
See id.; Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., RL32880, Administrative Subpoenas and
National Security Letters in Criminal and Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Background
and Proposed Adjustments 19 (2005); James G. McAdams III, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security 8 (March 2007),
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/researchby-subject/miscellaneous/ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdf.
47
See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v. Camez, No. 2:12-cr0004-APG-GWF, 2013 WL 6158402 (D. Nev. Nov. 21, 2013); Gonzales v. Google, Inc.,
234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
48
See, e.g., Yoo, Bulk Data, supra note 12, at 301, 302.
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ring data to government investigators. 49 As will be explained in Part II,
this awareness is an important consideration in the Supreme Court’s
contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine.
II. CONTEMPORARY CONFRONTATION CLAUSE DOCTRINE
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 50
A. The Crawford Framework
In Crawford v. Washington, 51 the Supreme Court set a new course in
its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 52 Prior to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause was subject to the reliability-based doctrine of Ohio v.
Roberts. 53 Under the Roberts doctrine, a statement presented no Confrontation Clause issue if it fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or contained “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 54
Distancing itself from the Roberts doctrine, the Court in Crawford
wrote that the Founders of the Constitution understood “witnesses” to be
defined as those who “bear testimony,” 55 and “testimony” to mean a
“solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact.” 56 The Court later made clear that the Confrontation Clause plays no role in determining the admissibility of nontestimonial statements. 57 The question of whether an un-confronted, out-ofcourt statement will be deemed inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause, therefore, turns first on whether the statement is “testimonial.” 58

49

See infra Section III.C.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
51
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
52
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2232 (2012).
53
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
54
Id. at 66.
55
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the
English Language 931 (New York, S. Converse 1828)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56
Id.
57
See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007).
58
Bellin, Digital Age, supra note 17, at 39.
50
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B. Defining “Testimonial”
Exactly what constitutes “testimonial” under Crawford is less than
clear. 59 In Davis v. Washington, 60 the Court established a “primary purpose” test to determine if statements made during an emergency 911 call
constituted a testimonial statement. 61 The Court declared statements
nontestimonial when made “under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” 62 The Court declared that statements are testimonial when “the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.” 63 In Michigan v. Bryant, 64 the Court provided structure to the “primary purpose” test when it held that statements
made by a dying gunshot victim were nontestimonial because the statements were made during an emergency resulting from the shooter remaining at large. 65
The Court most recently addressed the primary purpose test in Ohio v.
Clark. 66 In Clark, a preschool teacher noticed signs of physical abuse on
a young child and asked the child what had happened. 67 The child responded that “Dee” had hurt him. 68 The teacher then reported these signs
of suspected child abuse to authorities, as Ohio law required her to do. 69
The child was later deemed incompetent to testify at trial, though testimony about what he told his teacher was admitted. 70 Highlighting the
fact that the child’s statements were made to his teachers, and not a law
enforcement officer, the Court held that the child’s statements to his

59

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”).
60
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
61
See id. at 822.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
65
Id. at 1163–64.
66
Ohio v. Clark, No. 13–1352 (U.S. June 18, 2015).
67
State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 594–95 (Ohio 2013).
68
Id. at 595.
69
Id. at 594–95.
70
Id. at 595.
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teachers were not created with “the primary purpose of creating an outof-court substitute for testimony,” and therefore were not testimonial. 71
In its quest to define “testimonial,” the Court has also addressed several cases involving forensic lab reports. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 72 the prosecution presented affidavits reporting the results of forensic lab analysis that showed the substance seized from the defendant
was cocaine. 73 The Court found the lab results, which were sworn before
a notary, 74 to be testimonial statements requiring confrontation of the lab
analysts. 75 Similarly, the prosecution in Bullcoming v. New Mexico 76
presented a blood alcohol report analyzing the defendant’s blood alcohol
content. 77 The report was formalized and signed, though was not notarized. 78 The prosecution presented testimony of a lab analyst who was
“familiar with the testing device used to analyze [the defendant]’s blood
and with the laboratory’s testing procedures, but had neither participated
in nor observed the test on [the defendant]’s blood sample.” 79 Because
the Court found the report “more than adequate to qualify . . . as testimonial,” 80 the Confrontation Clause required the specific analyst whose
testimony was incorporated in the report to be made available for confrontation. 81
The Court addressed a third lab report case in Williams v. Illinois. 82
During a bench trial for aggravated criminal sexual assault, the prosecution presented Sandra Lambatos as an expert witness in forensic biology
71
Clark, No. 13–1352, slip op. at 12 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Court also stated, in dictum, that “the primary purpose test is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-of-court statements under
the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 7. But see id. at 3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing the “necessary but not always sufficient” language as “dicta” that is “absolutely
false”); Richard D. Friedman, Ohio v. Clark: Some Initial Thoughts, The Confrontation Blog
(June 19, 2015, 1:09 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2015/06/ohio-v-clarksome-initial-thoughts.html (referring to the court’s “necessary but not always sufficient”
language as dictum).
72
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
73
Id. at 307.
74
Id. at 308.
75
Id. at 311.
76
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
77
Id. at 2711.
78
Id. at 2717.
79
Id. at 2707.
80
Id. at 2717.
81
Id. at 2716.
82
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

Confronting Big Data

2023

and forensic DNA analysis. 83 Although Lambatos had performed neither
the test analyzing semen obtained from a vaginal swab taken from the
victim, nor the test analyzing blood drawn from the defendant, she had
examined the records of the DNA experts who had done so, and had testified that she would call the two samples a match. 84 Justice Alito authored the four-Justice plurality that found that Lambatos’s testimony
did not violate the Confrontation Clause for two independent reasons. 85
First, the plurality argued that Lambatos did not testify to the truth of
the matter asserted in the lab report, but rather the report was merely
used as the basis of her expert opinion. 86 Because the Court in Crawford
ruled that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted,” 87 the plurality in Williams found no Confrontation Clause violation. 88 Both Justice Thomas and the four-Justice dissent disagreed with
this rationale presented by the plurality. 89 Second, the plurality argued
that, even if the report had been submitted for its truth, the report was
nontestimonial. 90 Here the plurality appeared to invoke the primary purpose test in finding that “[t]he report was sought not for the purpose of
obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner . . . but for the purpose
of finding a rapist who was on the loose.” 91
Justice Thomas, consistent with his position in previous cases, 92 concluded in an opinion concurring in the judgment in Williams that there
was no Confrontation Clause violation “solely because [the report]
lacked the requisite formality and solemnity to be considered testimonial.” 93 Justice Breyer, who wrote a separate concurring opinion, noted

83

Id. at 2229.
Id. at 2230.
85
Id. at 2244.
86
Id. at 2239–41.
87
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,
414 (1985)).
88
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2240.
89
Id. at 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2268 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 2228, 2242–43 (plurality opinion).
91
Id. at 2228.
92
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
93
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
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that “[s]ix to twelve or more technicians could have been involved,” 94
and thought that additional briefing was necessary to answer “what, if
any, are the outer limits of the ‘testimonial statements’ rule set forth in
Crawford v. Washington?” 95
III. APPLYING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TO BIG DATA TRANSFERS
This Note argues that every piece of data transferred from Google to
government investigators, which is later used against a criminal defendant at trial, contains a testimonial statement under the Confrontation
Clause. As explained below, each piece of data has an implicit guarantee
that it has been collected and stored correctly. Additionally, an individual piece of data, or a small collection of data, can be enough to be a testimonial statement accusing the defendant of an act. Lastly, aggregating
data can create an additional testimonial statement under a Mosaic Theory of the Sixth Amendment. Though confrontation in these instances is
crucial, only a small number of witnesses are required for confrontation
under the theories presented below.
A. Implicit Guarantees
The first theory under which big data transfers implicate the Confrontation Clause results from the implicit guarantee Google provides to
government investigators when Google transfers data. When Google receives a government request for data, it must comply with the request or
face the possibility of being held in contempt of court. 96 A court order,
or a letter from the Director of the FBI, notifies Google of such a penalty
for noncompliance, 97 and thus the company is informed of the solemnity
of the situation. In describing the process Google uses to transfer data,
Google’s Chief Legal Officer stated, “We treat [government requests for

94

Id. at 2247 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2244–45.
96
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3511(c) (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(G), (h)(5)(D) (2012); see
also In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming sanctions against a company
that failed to comply with court orders to turn over particular information to the government
relating to the target of a criminal investigation).
97
Cf. Under Seal, 749 F.3d. at 281 (discussing court orders to a private party enjoining it
to submit data to the FBI, and outlining penalties for noncompliance).
95
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data] very seriously. We have lawyers review them.” 98 Similar to a traditional witness testifying in court, Google is being asked to provide a
“solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact.” 99 When Google transfers the data to government
investigators, it does so with the implicit guarantee that the company has
abided by the government request. 100 This guarantee becomes more apparent when Google, similar to the certified statements in MelendezDiaz and Bullcoming, sends data “to [i]nvestigators along with a
[c]ertificate of [a]uthenticity.” 101
This Note will refer to the Google employees who handle data in
these big data transfers as “data analysts.” In Melendez-Diaz, the Court
noted that “forensic analyst[s] responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the
evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.” 102 The same rationale applies to data analysts. 103 Even if Google is not as cozy with
government investigators as state lab analysts might be, the possibility
of a fraudulent or mistaken analyst still exists. 104 The Confrontation
Clause is thus implicated where data analysts guarantee the reliability of
data sent to government investigators.

98

Interview by Jackie Long with David Drummond, Chief Legal Officer, Google (June 11,
2013), available at http://www.channel4.com/news/google-prism-fsa-attorney-general-daviddrummond.
99
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 Webster, supra note 55, at
931) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100
Google can be said to guarantee this data because they are obligated to deliver data relevant to the government request, or be held in contempt of court. To deliver corrupted data,
or data altered by destruction, without informing the government of such corruption or destruction, would mean that Google has fallen short of its obligation.
101
Google, Way of a Warrant, Youtube (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
MeKKHxcJfh0 [hereinafter Google, Way of a Warrant]. Even if these steps are not followed
for every type of government request, or Google has altered their procedure, these steps are
useful as an example.
102
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).
103
See Clay Helberg, Conference Report, Third International Applied Statistics in Industry
Conference, Pitfalls of Data Analysis (or How to Avoid Lies and Damned Lies) (June 5–7,
1995), http://www2.cs.uregina.ca/~rbm/cs100/notes/spreadsheets/lies.htm (discussing “ways
people sometimes ‘bend the rules’ of statistics”).
104
See id.
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1. Collection
One way that Google provides an implicit guarantee to government
investigators results from the method Google uses to collect data in response to government requests. Google presumably collects data for
marketing purposes or other commercial endeavors, and not for the purpose of providing a testimonial statement. 105 The data analysts involved
in this original collection are therefore outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause. 106 After initially collecting the data, however, data analysts replying to a government request must sort through collected data
to pick out data “relevant” to the request. 107 The analysts who sort
through this trove of collected data in order to seek out data “relevant”
to the government request play two crucial roles that implicate the Confrontation Clause. First, these analysts decide what data to include in the
transfer to the government, and what data to leave out. 108 Second, these
analysts guarantee that the data they say was collected from a user’s
electronic device or account was indeed collected from such device or
account. 109
Regarding the first role, determining what data to include in an aggregation of data, and what data to leave out, constitutes a vitally important
step in data collection. 110 Providing the government with data showing
that a defendant queried from his computer “how to kill wife,” and “how
to bury dead body,” tells a very different story than is told by providing
the same queries, but adding “how to write a fictional novel about deadly lovers.” 111 Because Google seeks to narrow a government request for

105

See United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 642 (1st Cir. 2012).
See infra Section IV.B.
107
See Google, Way of a Warrant, supra note 101 (noting that broad requests are narrowed, and only relevant information is provided); see also Cameron, 699 F.3d at 648.
108
See Google, Way of a Warrant, supra note 101 (noting that the producer determines
what data to provide to the government to abide by the request).
109
See id. (noting that information is sent to investigators with a certificate of authenticity,
and a custodian of records is available to appear in court).
110
See Cameron, 699 F.3d at 648 (“[E]mployees removed the images they thought did not
depict child pornography, as said images would presumably not be relevant to the prosecution of a child pornography crime.”); cf. How Science Goes Wrong, supra note 32, at 1
(“Modern scientists are doing too much trusting and not enough verifying . . . .”).
111
Cf. Terms and Conditions May Apply (Hyrax Films 2013) (discussing a television
writer’s web searches involving murder mysteries).
106
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data, 112 it could be vital to a defendant’s defense to confront an analyst
and ask whether an additional exculpating query existed. A witness with
the opportunity to determine whether a defendant ends up on the New
York Times Best Seller list, or on death row, is a witness the Confrontation Clause presumably covers.
Regarding the second role, data analysts take analysis a step further
than the analysts in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. The lab analysts in
Melendez-Diaz did not guarantee that the cocaine they tested came from
the defendant. It was the police, and not the lab analysts, who arrested
the defendant and confiscated the cocaine. 113 Similarly, the lab analysts
in Bullcoming provided no guarantee that the blood sample shipped to
them from police actually came from the defendant’s body. 114 By comparison, it is the data analysts who tell government investigators that the
selected data was collected from the targeted user’s device or account. 115
A prosecutor therefore relies on Google’s assertion that the data was indeed collected from the defendant when she offers this evidence at trial. 116 If the data analyst responsible for connecting the data to the defendant is not subjected to confrontation, the defendant has no
opportunity to confront the very witness pointing the finger.
2. Storage
A second way that Google provides an implicit guarantee resulting in
a testimonial statement stems from the unique difficulties big data faces
regarding storage. 117 Data, including data stored in the “cloud,” is sus112
Transparency Report, Google, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/
faq/#what_does_fisa_compel (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
113
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307 (2009).
114
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
115
See Google, Way of a Warrant, supra note 101 (describing authentication mechanisms
such as certificates of authenticity, custodians of record, and corrections of government mistakes such as misspelled names).
116
Extending this argument to the extreme, all physical evidence could be considered “testimonial.” For example, a gun submitted into evidence might contain the police officer’s implicit assertion that he found the gun at the defendant’s house. These types of underlying
statements could often be handled through the use of stipulation and traditional foundation
evidence.
117
See Sean Gallagher, The Great Disk Drive in the Sky: How Web Giants Store Big—
and We Mean Big—Data, Ars Technica (Jan 26, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
business/2012/01/the-big-disk-drive-in-the-sky-how-the-giants-of-the-web-store-big-data
(discussing the complexity of the systems Google uses to store data).
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ceptible to corruption while in storage. 118 While corruption can be corrected, 119 an analyst providing the government with data is implying that
the data is correct, and that the data has not been altered by unreported
corruption. 120 Stored data is also susceptible to destruction. 121 As illustrated above in the “deadly lovers” example, missing data, perhaps missing because of destruction, can drastically alter an analysis. 122
Analysts involved in transferring requested data to the government
are implicitly providing a statement that the data has not been altered by
unreported destruction or corruption. 123 Similar to the lab analyst in
Bullcoming, who was to “not[e] any circumstance or condition which
might affect the integrity of the sample or otherwise affect the validity of
the analysis,” 124 a data analyst implies that the condition of the data is
sufficient to abide by the government’s request unless otherwise noted. 125 A criminal defendant should have the right to confront this data
analyst in order to inquire whether the data is at risk of containing misinformation, or whether additional data lost to destruction would have
painted a different picture.
A critical reader might contend that confrontation is unnecessary to
respond to the guarantees of proper storage where, similar to the data in
Williams, there may be telltale signs that disclose when data is corrupted. 126 This argument is insufficient for three reasons. First, the defendant
in Williams had the opportunity to confront an expert witness, rather
than no witness at all. 127 Second, even if telltale signs existed that could
show data corruption, that doesn’t necessarily provide the defendant
with an opportunity to inquire into data lost to destruction. Third, even if
118
See Jordan Tigani & Siddartha Naidu, Google BigQuery Analytics 356 (2014) [hereinafter
Tigani & Naidu, BigQuery]; Lakshmi N. Bairavasundaram et al., An Analysis of Data Corruption
in the Storage Stack, 6th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies 223 (2008),
available at https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/fast08/tech/full_papers/bairavasundaram/bairava
sundaram.pdf.
119
See Bairavasundaram et al., supra note 118, at 224.
120
See supra text accompanying note 100.
121
See Tigani and Naidu, BigQuery, supra note 118, at 25 (“[S]oftware is fallible.”).
122
See supra Subsection III.A.1.
123
See supra text accompanying note 100.
124
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2711 (2011) (quoting certificate of analyst).
125
See supra text accompanying note 100.
126
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2231 (2012) (noting lack of “telltale signs” of defective data).
127
See id. at 2230.
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there was a reliable way to see if these testimonial statements were subject to corruption and destruction worries, the Constitution is left unsatisfied. The Confrontation Clause “commands . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.” 128
3. Analysis of Small Collections of Data
In some instances, a single piece or small collection of data can constitute a testimonial statement in addition to the analyst’s guarantee of
proper collection and storage. Compare two hypotheticals. In both hypotheticals the defendant, in the course of espionage, stabs a man in an alley. Imagine also that, in both hypotheticals, the police question a witness who can place the defendant in the alley at the time of the stabbing.
In addition, the witness tells the police that the defendant asked “how do
I wipe fingerprints off a murder weapon?”
The difference between the two hypotheticals is that in one, the witness claims that he was walking by the alley and saw the defendant with
his own eyes, and heard the defendant ask about fingerprints with his
own ears. In the other, the witness is a Google analyst who tells investigators that the phrase “how do I wipe fingerprints off a murder weapon?” was queried from the defendant’s smartphone at the time of the
crime, and was queried from the location of the alley.
The witness in the first hypothetical is a straightforward example of
someone providing a testimonial statement, and the defendant would
have the right to confront this witness. 129 The same rationale should apply to the Google analyst. 130 In both hypotheticals, the witness is telling
investigators that the defendant was at a given location at a given time.
Admission of the question that the witness is alleging the defendant to
have asked is trickier. The defendant asking “how do I wipe fingerprints
off a murder weapon?” is unlikely to be a testimonial statement because
128

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also Ohio v. Clark, No. 13–1352,
slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 18, 2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Crawford remains the law.”).
129
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (holding that a witness statement to the police incriminating the defendant in stabbing was a testimonial statement).
130
See United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 653–54 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding reports
containing location data to require confrontation). But see id. at 654 (Howard, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for “taking an unjustified step beyond what current Supreme Court
precedent dictates”).
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it is unlikely his own words were provided with the intent to be used
against him in a criminal proceeding. 131 The claim made by the witness
to investigators that the defendant said such a thing, however, is a testimonial statement. 132 Whether the witness claims to have witnessed the
defendant ask the question vocally or electronically, the defendant has
the right to confrontation.
In many situations, a limited amount of data can be used to accuse the
defendant of committing a crime. 133 A computer, however, does not directly say that John Doe was driving at a given speed, bought or sold
something illegal, or has a gambling addiction. 134 It takes a person to
translate what the computer provides into relevant evidence. 135 By
“translate,” this Note refers to obvious acts of translation such as converting zeros and ones into English, as well as much more subtle acts of
analysis. A zealous prosecutor might argue that data transferred from
Google to the government is sufficiently formulaic to be considered
computer-produced conclusions rather than human assertions. For the
reasons provided in this subsection, such an argument is incorrect.136
Regardless of whether the translation is subtle or obvious, the Confrontation Clause is implicated.
Regarding the more obvious acts of translation, the importance of an
analyst’s ability and decisions is clear. 137 If an analyst converts computer-generated data showing that the defendant was in Hollywood, California, into a statement accusing the defendant of being in Hollywood,
Florida, the usefulness of confrontation seems straightforward.

131
See James J. Tomkovicz, Constitutional Exclusion: The Rules, Rights, and Remedies
That Strike the Balance Between Freedom and Order 397 n.398 (2011) (“The use of a defendant’s self-inculpatory hearsay statements at trial raises no Sixth Amendment issue.”);
Bellin, Digital Age, supra note 17, at 34 (“[F]ew electronic utterances appear to fall within
the Court’s definition of ‘testimonial.’”).
132
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (“Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.”).
133
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (discussing locational data).
134
See id. at 2490, 2492 (discussing the capabilities of mobile applications).
135
See Erick J. Poorbaugh, Note, Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized Evidence and
the Confrontation Clause Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 Regent U. L. Rev. 213, 220–29
(2010).
136
See id. for an explanation of when a computer-generated statement transforms into a
statement made by a person.
137
See, e.g., Casen B. Ross, Comment, Clogged Conduits: A Defendant’s Right to Confront His Translated Statements, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1931 (2014).
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Smaller acts of analysis should also implicate the defendant’s right to
confrontation. Assuming Google transfers data to the government in its
most “raw” form, the Google analyst who handles the data still makes
several decisions that represent the analyst’s opinion. These opinions are
carried forward with the data. This is because there is no such thing as
“raw data” that is untouched by the perceptions of those who handle
it. 138 Different professions operate under different premises as to what
counts as data, and how data should be treated and relied on. 139 Data can
therefore never truly be the objective source it is often claimed to be. 140
Some courts have been too quick to assume the opposite, 141 though in
one notable instance the Supreme Court has corrected a lower court for
doing so. 142 Just like a traditional witness, a data analyst takes in data
from the world and translates it into a testimonial statement.
4. Lower Court Application
This Note’s first theory under which big data transfers can implicate
the Confrontation Clause—where testimonial statements result from the
collection, storage, and analysis of data—already finds support in some
lower courts. At least one federal district court appears ready to adopt
this Note’s first theory, 143 and at least one federal appeals court has already done so. 144 In United States v. Cameron, 145 the defendant objected
on Confrontation Clause grounds to Google, Yahoo!, and CyberTipline
138

See Lisa Gitelman & Virginia Jackson, Introduction to “Raw Data” is an Oxymoron 1
(Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013) [hereinafter Gitelman, Oxymoron]; Laura Kurgan, Close Up at a
Distance: Mapping, Technology, and Politics 35 (2013); Tara R. Price, Note, “Bull” Coming
from the States: Why the Supreme Court Should Use Williams v. Illinois to Close One of
Bullcoming’s Confrontation Clause Loopholes, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 533, 550–51 (2012).
139
See Gitelman, Oxymoron, supra note 138, at 7.
140
See id.; Kurgan, supra note 138, at 35.
141
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230–31 (4th Cir. 2007) (referring
to the identification of drugs in a defendant’s blood as “a conclusion drawn only from the
machines’ data,” whose source was “independent of human observation or reporting”); State
v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 9 (N.M. 2010) (referring to analyst as a “mere scrivener”).
142
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2011) (disagreeing with the
“mere scrivener” description of an analyst).
143
United States v. Muhammad, No. 1:14cr36-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 6680606, at *3 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 25, 2014) (acknowledging that the court “cannot conclude that the statements of
a witness who is necessary to establish the authenticity of records which consist of [electronic] statements attributable to Defendant are clearly not ‘testimonial’”).
144
United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012).
145
Id.

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2032

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:2011

records presented at his trial for crimes involving child pornography. 146
In finding some admitted records to have violated the Confrontation
Clause, the First Circuit distinguished records that contained only data
“collected automatically in order to further . . . business purposes”147
from records that constituted statements made with the primary purpose
of “establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to a later
criminal prosecution.” 148 As justification for distinguishing these two
types of records, the First Circuit cited Melendez-Diaz for the proposition that, though business records often do not implicate the Confrontation Clause, some business records may still do so if the primary purpose of the records is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution. 149
As the above discussion of collection, storage, and analysis demonstrates, this Note agrees with the First Circuit that the Confrontation
Clause is implicated when a report “do[es] not merely present preexisting data . . . [but] convey[s] an analysis that was performed using
pre-existing data.” 150 Accentuating the fact that data analysts removed
images that they thought did not depict child pornography before forwarding the data, the First Circuit found the analysts who prepared the
data in question to have created a new statement with the primary purpose that was law enforcement related. 151 This Note agrees with this line
of reasoning.
This Note will now take the logic in Cameron one step further. By
distinguishing the situation where data analysts submit some of the data
that has been collected, the First Circuit seemed to suggest that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated where data analysts submit all of the
data they have at their disposal. 152 As explained in Section III.B, however, by applying the Mosaic Theory to big data transfers, the Confrontation Clause can still be implicated when Google submits all of the data it
has collected on an individual.

146

Id. at 627, 638.
Id. at 641.
148
Id. at 643 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 n.6 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
149
Id. at 640 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 557 U.S. 305 (2009)).
150
Id. at 647.
151
Id. at 648.
152
Id. at 647.
147
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B. The Mosaic Theory
The second theory under which this Note argues big data transfers can
constitute testimonial statements is grounded in a novel application of
the Mosaic Theory. 153 The Mosaic Theory is typically discussed in connection with the Fourth Amendment, 154 and can be described as a theory
“envision[ing] thousands of bits and pieces of apparently innocuous information, which when properly assembled create a picture.” 155 Data analyzed in aggregate can often create more value than just the summation
of the individual pieces. 156 The Mosaic Theory therefore offers a perfect
framework to examine the synergy created by big data.
Under the Mosaic Theory of the Sixth Amendment, a witness who
provides “n” testimonial statements might be said to have provided
“n + 1” (or more) testimonial statements when all “n” statements are
considered in aggregate. Even if the Mosaic Theory is ignored, however,
one is still left with an aggregation of testimonial statements to which
the Confrontation Clause applies individually. 157
1. Implicit Conclusions
Under the Mosaic Theory, conclusions can sometimes be drawn
through an aggregation of data without an analyst providing an explicit
conclusion of their own. For example, a witness who states that she (1)
drew four equal lines that were (2) connected by four ninety degree angles, has also stated that (3) she drew a square. A similar example would
involve a witness accusing a defendant of committing the separate elements of a crime, but not expressly stating that the defendant committed
the crime. This Note refers to such conclusions as “implicit conclusions.” Addressing implicit conclusions within big data helps prevent attempts to skirt the requirements of the Constitution when providing a
testimonial statement. 158 Consider an example.
153

See Kerr, supra note 12, for an explanation of the Mosaic Theory.
See id. at 320.
155
Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 2006) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
156
See Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, Big Data, supra note 3, at 76.
157
See supra Section III.A (explaining testimonial statements regarding collection, storage,
and analysis of small amounts or individual pieces of data).
158
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging the problem of prosecutorial evasion of the Confrontation Clause).
154
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If the prosecution submitted, for the truth of the matter asserted, a
witness affidavit stating “I witnessed Walter verbally assault Henry,”
Walter would have the right to confront that witness. 159 The Confrontation Clause should not apply differently if the witness’s affidavit contained an aggregation of statements that as a whole deliver the same
message. Such an affidavit might include statements such as: Walter and
Henry were standing next to each other, a human voice verbally assaulted Henry, Walter was moving his lips and staring at Henry, the human
voice sounded like Walter’s, and there was nobody else within hearing
distance of Walter and Henry. Although this collection of statements
does not create perfect certainty that the witness saw Walter assault
Henry—the witness, for example, might have mistaken his own conscience for an external voice—such a lack of certainty is irrelevant for
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The statement “I saw Walter
verbally assault Henry” is subject to the very same uncertainty as the
aggregation of statements describing the same event. The Confrontation
Clause should apply the same, even if the statement “I witnessed Walter
verbally assault Henry” was deconstructed into a collection of lesser
statements that in aggregate deliver the same message.
2. Explicit Conclusions
In addition to implicit conclusions, data analysts may examine an aggregation of data and present a conclusion as to what it means. For example, a data analyst might examine data showing that someone with the
defendant’s height, weight, fingerprints, gait, and irregular heartbeat was
at location “x” at time “t.” 160 This data analyst might therefore conclude
that the defendant was at location “x” at time “t.” This is an example of
what this Note refers to as an “explicit conclusion.” An explicit conclusion is nothing more than a data analyst’s opinion as to what a collection
of data means. Though it may be a very reliable opinion, the Confronta-

159
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (holding that a witness statement to the police incriminating the defendant in stabbing was a testimonial statement implicating the Confrontation Clause).
160
This data can be collected using “Health & Fitness” apps available on iTunes. See
iTunes App Store Health & Fitness, Apple, https://itunes.apple.com/us/genre/ios-healthfitness/id6013?mt=8 (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
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tion Clause cannot be sidestepped simply by extraconstitutional guarantees of reliability. 161
This Note cannot definitively state whether an explicit conclusion is
more likely to be formed by a Google analyst, or a data analyst on the
government side of a transfer. Google transfers data to the government
both by hand, and through file-transferring technology that allows parties to upload and download files between each other. 162 Although the
method Google uses to transfer data to government investigators has
been made public, the degree of analysis performed by Google before
transferring the data is relatively hard to determine. 163 Regardless of
whether a government or Google analyst forms the conclusion, if data is
presented at trial in the form of an explicit conclusion, then a criminal
defendant has the right to confront the analyst who formed that conclusion. 164
C. Google’s Intent and Targeted Individuals
The intent of the parties is an important consideration under the primary purpose test. 165 In Ohio v. Clark, the Court asked whether the
statement was “given with the primary purpose of creating an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony.” 166 Judged under such a framework,
when Google transfers data to government investigators they provide a
testimonial statement. Google’s ability to designate a “custodian of records” to testify regarding other data analysts’ out-of-court statements

161

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
Claire Cain Miller, Google Offers Some Detail About How It Transfers Data to the Government, N.Y. Times Bits Blog (June 12, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/
12/google-offers-some-detail-about-how-it-transfers-data-to-the-government/?_php=true&_type=
blogs&_r=0.
163
See David Drummond, Asking the U.S. Government to Allow Google to Publish More
National Security Request Data, Official Google Blog (June 11, 2013), http://googleblog.blog
spot.com/2013/06/asking-us-government-to-allow-google-to.html.
164
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 642–43 (1st Cir. 2012).
165
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
166
Ohio v. Clark, No. 13–1352, slip op. at 12 (U.S. June 18, 2015) (quoting Bryant, 131 S.
Ct. at 1155) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162
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suggests that Google is providing data with the intent to create an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony. 167
In applying the primary purpose test, the Court in Clark highlighted
both the formality of the setting in which the statements were made, and
whether there was an ongoing emergency. 168 Distinguishing the informal
setting in which the teachers questioned the child in Clark from formal
statements made to law enforcement officers, the Court found the child’s
statements to be nontestimonial. 169 By comparison, statements made by
Google to inquiring government investigators are more like the types of
formal statements made to law enforcement officers that the Court in
Clark was concerned about. In fact, the Court in Clark noted that statements made to law enforcement officers are more likely to be found testimonial than statements made to non-law enforcement officers. 170
Relevant to the ongoing emergency factor of the primary purpose test,
Google has a special process for emergency requests. 171 Google has explained that “[t]he government needs legal process—such as a subpoena,
court order or search warrant—to force Google to disclose user information. Exceptions can be made in certain emergency cases. . . .” 172
Google describes an example of an emergency as “involving kidnapping
or bomb threats,” and stated that “[e]mergency requests must contain a
description of the emergency and an explanation of how the information
requested might prevent the harm.” 173 Having a separate procedure for
emergency requests suggests that, for nonemergency requests where
“[t]he government needs legal process,” 174 Google intends their statement to investigators to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 175
167
See Google, Way of a Warrant, supra note 101; see also United States v. Camez, No.
2:12-cr-0004-APG-GWF, 2013 WL 6158402, at *8 (D. Nev. Nov. 21, 2013) (denying nonparty Google, Inc.’s motion to quash trial subpoena).
168
Clark, No. 13–1352, slip op. at 7–9.
169
Id. at 8–9.
170
Id. at 7.
171
Transparency Report, Google, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/
legalprocess/#does_a_law_enforcement (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (recognizing that statements are
testimonial when derived from an interrogation whose primary purpose “is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”).
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Whether government investigators flag their request as an emergency
or nonemergency also seems telling of the investigators’ intentions.
Even more telling, FISA has a provision where data can be collected
without prior court approval if the Attorney General “reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists.” 176 This suggests that when the
emergency situation provision is not used, the communication between
the government and Google under a FISA request would not be considered an ongoing emergency under the “primary purpose” test.
Whether or not government investigators request data on a “targeted”
individual is also an important consideration under the primary purpose
test. In finding no Confrontation Clause violation, the plurality in Williams stressed that the lab report “was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual,” and that when the sample was
sent for testing, the defendant was not “under suspicion at that time.” 177
Big data transfers, by comparison, satisfy this targeted individual requirement. 178
The Chief Architect at Google has written that “the only way in which
Google reveals information about users are when we receive lawful,
specific orders about individuals.” 179 Similarly, Microsoft issued a
statement that the company “only ever compl[ies] with orders for requests about specific accounts or identifiers.” 180 Additionally, Google
has made available statistics detailing the extent of government requests. 181 Google filters these statistics in several ways, including
through a “Users/Accounts Specified” feature. 182 Google has also stated
that they scrutinize government requests and narrow the scope if possible. 183 Unlike the DNA analysis in Williams, 184 the data requested by the
176

50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1)(A) (2012).
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012).
178
See Long, supra note 98 (“[W]e get specific orders. They are under the law in the US,
targeted orders.”).
179
Yonatan Zunger, Google Plus (June 7, 2013), https://plus.google.com/+YonatanZunger/
posts/huwQsphBron.
180
Brad Smith, Responding to Government Legal Demands for Customer Data, Microsoft on
the Issues (July 16, 2013), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2013/07/16/responding-togovernment-legal-demands-for-customer-data.
181
Transparency Report, Google, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/
(last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
182
Id.
183
Google, Way of a Warrant, supra note 101.
184
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 (2012).
177
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government from Google appears to be tailored toward specifically targeted individuals.
D. Expanding Contemporary Doctrine
Some scholars appear loath to expand contemporary Confrontation
Clause doctrine in the area of forensic analysis examined in Bullcoming
and Melendez-Diaz. 185 While expanding contemporary doctrine in this
area may at first appear controversial, 186 there are considerable reasons
to do so when it comes to big data transfers. First, the common objections raised in present literature to expanding contemporary doctrine do
not apply to big data transfers. Second, recent Supreme Court cases have
hinted that the Court is prepared to expand doctrine in this area. Lastly,
there is a beneficial policy reason that supports such an expansion: the
promotion of privacy at reduced cost to security.
1. Objections Do Not Apply to Big Data
One objection to expanding the forensic evidence line of cases is that
it would be undesirably costly. 187 Such an unaffordable increase in cost,
however, will not materialize for three reasons. First, as argued in Part
IV, only individuals who have provided a stand-alone testimonial statement should implicate the Confrontation Clause. One can imagine this
group of analysts as a “bottle neck,” or top of a pyramid. There are presumably fewer analysts at the top of the pyramid, interacting with gov185

See sources cited supra note 17.
See Tom Jackman & Rosalind S. Helderman, Kaine Calls Legislative Session to
Change Laws After Ruling on Trial Testimony, Wash. Post (July 23, 2009), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/22/AR2009072203533.html (describing state
legislative action necessitated by Melendez-Diaz).
187
See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (warning of “economic pressures [which] would encourage prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely instead on older forms of evidence . . . that are less reliable”). Amici and subsequent analyses pertaining to Williams offered similar warnings. See, e.g., Brief for Fern New York County District Attorney’s Office
and the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 8–12, Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (No. 10-8505); Sean K. Driscoll, “I Messed
Up Bad”: Lessons on the Confrontation Clause from the Annie Dookhan Scandal, 56 Ariz.
L. Rev. 707, 736–37 (2014); Andrew W. Eichner, Note, The Failures of Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts and the Unstable Confrontation Clause, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 437, 449–51
(2011). But see Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2275 n.6 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting lack of evidence to support plurality’s warning in Williams); Friedman, Round Four, supra note 17, at
77 (“[M]y response [to the plurality’s warning in Williams] is, Oh, come on, really.”).
186
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ernment investigators and thus implicating the Confrontation Clause,
than there are analysts performing more attenuated acts such as originally collecting the data or mopping the front lobby. 188 Second, though mistakes can happen, 189 and an attorney may fish for a mistake by calling
every analyst possible, there are internalized costs associated with such a
strategy. 190 While rules of evidence cannot trump the Constitution, 191
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 192—and state equivalents—can limit the
incentive of calling repetitive witnesses. 193 Third, notice-and-demand
statutes can be used as a cost-limiting tool. 194 Notice-and-demand statutes require prosecutors “to provide notice to the defendant of [their] intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the
admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial.” 195 Through the use of notice-and-demand statutes, a defendant may
opt to call fewer witnesses than he has the right to, and thereby reduce
trial costs. 196
Another objection to expanding the forensic evidence line of cases is
that doing so would hamper the prosecution of sexual assault and do188

See Richard D. Friedman, Is There a Multi-Witness Problem with Respect to Forensic Lab
Tests?, The Confrontation Blog (Dec. 7, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
2010/12/is-there-multi-witness-problem-with.html (finding an average of 1.24 witnesses to present DNA evidence).
189
See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing an analyst
who confused DNA samples collected from the defendant and from the victim).
190
See Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory 338–40 (2001) (describing a costbenefit analysis of obtaining and using more evidence); see also Bradley, supra note 17, at
325–27 (suggesting defense counsel must present reasonable explanations for crossexamination).
191
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2256 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
192
Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
193
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182–85 (1997) (considering evidentiary
alternatives); Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note (“The availability of other means
of proof may also be an appropriate factor.”); Posner, supra note 190, at 349 (recognizing a
judge’s ability to “limit the amount of search [for evidence] that the lawyers do”).
194
Danae VanSickle Grace, Note, The Sky Is Not Falling: How the Anticlimactic Application of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts to Oklahoma’s Laboratory Report Procedures Allows Room for Improvement, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 383, 383 (2011); Mark Hansen, Taking
Techs to Trial: Two Terms in a Row, Justices Weigh Bringing Lab Analysts into Court, 96
A.B.A. J. 17, 18 (Jan. 2010).
195
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326 (2009).
196
See id. at 314 n.3; Hansen, supra note 194, at 18.
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mestic abuse cases where survivors cannot cooperate and forensic evidence is extraordinarily useful. 197 These serious concerns, however, need
not necessarily result from requiring confrontation of data analysts. 198
These concerns are motivated by the possibility that increasing the cost
of presenting forensic evidence will lead prosecutors to either refrain
from prosecuting, or to rely on less reliable evidence. 199 As explained
above, however, requiring confrontation of data analysts will not lead to
severe increases in cost. Additionally, more fundamental concerns regarding sexual abuse and domestic violence can be addressed through a
robust forfeiture doctrine, where a defendant forfeits the right to confrontation when the defendant is responsible for the unavailability of the
witness. 200
Lastly, many scholars have been critical of the historical and textual
justifications in Crawford, and the resulting applications in Bullcoming
and Melendez-Diaz. 201 Confrontation Clause doctrine, however, had
been inconstant before Crawford. 202 Considering that other criminal procedure rights have had nearly an additional half-century to settle than

197

See Bellin, Shrinking, supra note 17, at 1910 (referring to “the difficulties of prosecuting domestic violence and child abuse offenses where victims are unable or unwilling to cooperate with prosecutors”); Sarah M. Buel, Davis and Hammon: Missed Cues Result in Unrealistic Dichotomy, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 19 (2007) (addressing similar concerns with Davis v.
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana); Dripps, supra note 17 (examining the effect of Crawford and its progeny on domestic violence cases); Tuerkheimer, supra note 17 (addressing
domestic abuse cases since Crawford).; Keenan, supra note 17, at 14 (warning that after
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, “[p]rosecutors should . . . be concerned that they might lose an
essential tool [in the form of DNA database evidence] for prosecuting rape cases and seeking
justice for victims”).
198
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2275 n.6 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
199
See id. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
200
See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367–68 (2008) (explaining that the right to confrontation can be forfeited when defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying);
see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of
Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2006) (addressing forfeiture and domestic violence cases).
201
See Bellin, Shrinking, supra note 17, at 1877–78 (criticizing the Court for restricting
the right of confrontation to only testimonial statements); Bradley, supra note 17, at 320,
322, 327–28 (same); Davies, supra note 17, at 106–07 (same); Fisher, Debacle, supra note
17, at 19–22 (same). But see Fisher, The Next Ten, supra note 16, at 10 (“Crawford is fundamentally sound.”).
202
See Akhil Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 641, 690 (1996)
(noting, pre-Crawford, that “the legal community lacks a good map of [the Six Amendment’s] basic contours,” with Confrontation Clause case law in particular being “surprisingly
muddled in logic and exposition”).
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contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine has, such criticism is
premature. 203
Even if the Crawford framework were abandoned, statements contained in big data transfers would still require confrontation under alternatively proposed interpretations of the Confrontation Clause. For example, under the alternative regime proposed by Professor George
Fisher, the testimonial statements discussed in this Note are unlikely to
fall within the group of “rather rare instances when hearsay may be admitted without cross-examination.” 204 Outside of Dean John Wigmore’s
famously narrow view that has never been adopted by the Supreme
Court, 205 many scholars find Crawford and its progeny too narrow. 206
Broadening the right of confrontation to nontestimonial statements
would only encircle the statements in big data described in this Note
more comfortably. At the other end of the spectrum, if the Court were to
abandon Crawford and return to a Roberts reliability regime, there does
not appear to be a majority of Justices who would remove the types of
technical analysis discussed in this Note from the requirements of confrontation. 207

203

Cf. Fisher, The Next Ten, supra note 16, at 15–16 (calling attention to the ongoing development of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” and “reasonable
person would feel free to leave” case law).
204
Fisher, Debacle, supra note 17, at 30; see also id. (excepting from cross-examination,
inter alia, reports by lab technicians “ignorant of the results prosecutors desire”).
205
Dean Wigmore’s view restricted the right of confrontation to live prosecution witnesses
at trial. Bellin, Shrinking, supra note 17, at 1872 (citing John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on
the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1397, at 1755 (1st ed. 1904)).
206
See, e.g., Bellin, Shrinking, supra note 17, at 1877–78; Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witness” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory
Process, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 155, 164 (2006); Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 401, 405–06 (2005); Mosteller, supra note 17, at 709–12;
Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its Loss, 15
J.L. & Pol’y 725, 727 (2007).
207
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2275 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Scientific testing is . . . only as reliable as the people who perform it.”); see also id. at 2255
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding a statement nontestimonial because of its
lack of formality and solemnity). Justice Thomas makes five Justices. See supra Section
III.A, for a discussion on the solemnity of big data transfers.
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2. Recent Supreme Court Indicators
Last year, in Riley v. California, 208 the Supreme Court unanimously
held that the Constitution recognizes the difference between data stored
digitally in cell phones and data stored in traditional objects such as a
diary or a photo album. 209 The Court stated that “a cell phone collects in
one place many distinct types of information . . . that reveal much more
in combination than any isolated record.” 210 The Court also noted that
smartphone applications, when considered in aggregate, “can form a revealing montage of the user’s life.” 211 Perhaps most relevant to the Confrontation Clause, the Court stated that data collected in a cell phone
“can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals.” 212
The Court’s unanimous opinion in Riley was consistent with the
views of at least five Justices in United States v. Jones, 213 where the
Court held that the warrantless use of a tracking device on the defendant’s car violated the Fourth Amendment. 214 Concurring in Jones, Justice Sotomayor explained how location data could be used in aggregate
not only to reveal where the person had been, but also to generate a record reflecting the individual’s familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations. 215 Justice Alito opened his opinion concurring
in the judgment by stating that the case called the Court to apply the
Constitution to “21st-century surveillance,” 216 and explained how the
GPS tracking abilities of smartphones could be aggregated to create useful information. 217
Although both Riley and Jones addressed the Fourth Amendment, if
the rationale expressed in those opinions is any indication of how the
Court will treat the related criminal procedure rights in the Sixth
Amendment, then the big data transfers addressed in this Note are likely
to implicate the Confrontation Clause. Perhaps because Professor Jeffrey
208

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Id. at 2490.
210
Id. at 2489.
211
Id. at 2490.
212
Id. at 2493.
213
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
214
Id. at 949.
215
Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
216
Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
217
Id. at 963.
209
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Fisher—who successfully argued Riley—also argued Clark, Bullcoming,
Melendez-Diaz, and Crawford, 218 the parallel between the Court’s recent
Fourth Amendment doctrine and the Confrontation Clause is most notable in the essential rationale of Riley. The fundamental question in Riley
was “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.” 219 Distinguishing the physical object of a cell phone, which officers
remain free to examine even after Riley, the Court held that when it
comes to data within the physical object, “officers must generally secure
a warrant.” 220 The Court came to this holding because digital data “differ[s] in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects
that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” 221
3. Beneficial Policy Reason
Information leaked by former government contractor Edward Snowden renewed a debate regarding the constitutionality of modern government surveillance. 222 Much of the current literature discussing these programs focuses on the President’s authority under Article II of the
Constitution, and the limitations of the Fourth Amendment. 223 It appears
that at least one Supreme Court Justice would agree that addressing
these issues with the Fourth Amendment alone is too rigid a strategy. 224
Using the Confrontation Clause as a check on government surveillance
provides much of the benefit that relying on the Fourth Amendment
provides—namely, the protection of individual privacy 225—at much less

218

Resume of Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford Law School, law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2015/06/JFisher-2015-June-resume.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
219
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480 (2014).
220
Id. at 2485.
221
Id. at 2489.
222
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 12; Napolitano, supra note 12, at 538–52; Laura K.
Donohue, NSA Surveillance May Be Legal—But It’s Unconstitutional, Wash. Post (June 21,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nsa-surveillance-may-be-legal—but-its-unconsti
tutional/2013/06/21/b9ddec20-d44d-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html.
223
See Vladeck, After Snowden, supra note 12, at 335 (arguing that the debate has shifted
away from preventing front-end collection).
224
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (referring to the “blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment”).
225
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967); Donohue, supra note 12, at
774–76.
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of a cost in terms of security. The reduced cost stems from the minimal
burdens of such a check on investigators in the field. 226
An investigator can acquire as many testimonial statements she deems
necessary to prevent crime without implicating the Confrontation
Clause. 227 It is only once the evidence is presented at court that the Confrontation Clause is implicated. 228 Though an investigator may decide
not to collect evidence she knows will be inadmissible at trial, the primary purpose test alleviates some of this concern as it allows an investigator to collect evidence more freely if the purpose is to meet an ongoing emergency. 229 Additionally, such a hypothetical cost borne by
investigators would seem to be much less than the cost created by a rigid
Fourth Amendment requirement, under which investigators must delay
investigations to seek a warrant. 230 Recognizing the ability of the Confrontation Clause to address big data transfers, rather than relying on a
rigid Fourth Amendment doctrine, allows for this beneficial difference
in cost to be captured.
IV. WHAT THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REQUIRES FROM GOOGLE
This Part responds to the concern Justice Breyer expressed in his concurrence in Williams, which called on the Court to address “the outer
limits of the ‘testimonial statements’ rule set forth in Crawford v. Washington.” 231 This Note will use Google’s procedures for dealing with government data requests as a representative example of other companies
similar to Google, such as Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Facebook. 232 This
226
See Brief for Respondent at 31, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352),
2015 WL 106919, at *31 (“The exclusionary rules this Court has created to enforce the
Fourth Amendment . . . are all designed to regulate police conduct . . . . ‘The Confrontation
Clause,’ by contrast, ‘in no way governs police conduct.’” (quoting Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006))).
227
See id.; Fisher, The Next Ten, supra note 16, at 12–13.
228
See U.S. Const. amend. VI. (referring to “criminal prosecutions”); see also George
Fisher, Evidence 676 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013) (“[W]e encounter the Confrontation Clause . . . only if the government offers hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant.”).
229
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (2006).
230
See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881,
885–89 (1991).
231
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2244 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
232
See Pasquale, supra note 40, at 112 (recognizing Google as a “de facto lawmaker for
many aspects of life on the Internet”).
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Part’s analysis of Google’s procedures under this system demonstrates
the small number of witnesses required for confrontation.
A. Attenuation Standard
Whom must a criminal defendant have the opportunity to confront in
order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause as applied to big data transfers?
This Note proposes the following answer: an individual who provides a
“stand-alone” testimonial statement.
“Stand-alone” in this context means a testimonial statement that, by
itself, is capable of proving a fact at a criminal trial. This definition uses
an “attenuation standard” to determine who has provided a stand-alone
testimonial statement, and excludes individuals who either provided no
testimonial statement, or who merely played a role in crafting someone
else’s testimonial statement.
B. Google as an Example
Instead of examining the attenuation standard in the abstract, it is useful to examine how it applies to the procedures Google uses in responding to government requests for data. Google has stated that “[w]hen we
receive such a request, our team reviews the request to make sure it satisfies legal requirements and Google’s policies. . . . If we believe a request is overly broad, we’ll seek to narrow it.” 233
It may be easier to first examine who does not provide a testimonial
statement. On the outskirts of the attenuation spectrum is a Google employee such as a janitor. A janitor ensures that the office is habitable,
which is arguably a prerequisite for other Google employees to prepare
the data requested by the government. It seems obvious that the janitor
would not implicate the Confrontation Clause. This is because the janitor merely helps to shape someone else’s testimonial statement, and does
not provide a stand-alone testimonial statement himself.
The results of the attenuation standard are less obvious when applied
to the individuals who create and manage the algorithms Google uses to
collect data. 234 It is unlikely that these individuals design or manage al233
Transparency Report, Google, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/
legalprocess (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
234
See How Search Works: Algorithms, Google, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/how
searchworks/algorithms.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) (explaining algorithms).
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gorithms with the intent of providing a testimonial statement. 235 Companies exist, however, that are in the business of aggregating data and selling it to government agencies to assist in criminal investigations. 236 In
the case of such companies, it seems more likely that the company’s algorithms and procedures are designed and managed with the intent to
provide testimonial statements. In fact, employees at these companies
have the potential to be very useful witnesses because they can learn
what type of testimony is usually admitted or denied and can adapt their
algorithms and procedures accordingly. 237 Employees at these companies implicate the Confrontation Clause if they design or manage algorithms with the primary purpose of providing evidence for trial, and
those employees would be required to be available for confrontation.
Putting those unique companies aside and focusing on Google, the algorithm designers and managers at Google likely originally collect and
store data for marketing purposes, 238 and therefore those Google employees do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
Less attenuated than either the janitor or the employees responsible
for designing or managing algorithms is a “screener.” A Google screener
sorts and prioritizes government requests for data. 239 Although it is
tempting to label the screener as providing a testimonial statement, the
tasks performed by the screener are too attenuated to require confrontation. By simply screening and prioritizing requests that will be responded to by other employees, the screener, like the janitor, is merely helping
to shape someone else’s testimonial statement. The fact that the screener
is not required for confrontation makes clear that the line separating
those employees who must be available for confrontation from those
employees who do not cannot always be drawn at the moment the government requests data from a company. It is tempting to draw the line at
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that point, because it is then that the company is aware that they will be
providing a testimonial statement to the government. If someone tells
the janitor, however, that the government has requested data, and the
janitor continues to do his job with newfound motivation, he is not now
magically transformed into providing a testimonial statement.
It is also tempting to conclude that because the screener “sorts and
prioritizes” government requests for information, 240 the screener is therefore determining whether there is an ongoing emergency under the primary purpose test. The primary purpose test, however, is an objective
test. 241 The subjective intentions of the screener are therefore not determinative. 242 Even if a Google screener had the authority to subjectively
determine what the Sixth Amendment requires, the screener is not necessarily attempting to do so by prioritizing requests. A number of factors
unrelated to the emergency status of the statement could go into the
screener’s ranking, such as which requests would be easier to respond
to.
The line designating which Google employees must be available for
confrontation begins with the “producer.” The producer “determin[es]
what information to provide” the government in order to comply with
the request. 243 Two aspects of the producer’s duty indicate that she is
providing a testimonial statement.
First, the producer provides a testimonial statement by determining
what data is relevant to the government request, and then producing that
data. 244 Here a comparison to the Fifth Amendment’s “act of production” analysis is helpful. 245 In United States v. Hubbell, 246 the Supreme
Court distinguished between the contents within material that was produced in response to a government request and the actual act of producing the material. 247 Referring to the act of producing the material, the
Court stated that “[t]he assembly of literally hundreds of pages of material in response to a [government] request . . . is the functional equiva240
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lent of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interrogatory or a series of oral questions . . . .” 248 Just as in Hubbell, a Google
producer is similarly providing a statement to government investigators
when she produces a collection of data. This statement is analytically
distinct from the content of the data. 249 The content of the data that the
Google producer decides to provide, however, is also significant. As explained in Subsection III.A.1, what a collection of data does not include
can be just as important as what it does include. Again, adding “how to
write a fictional novel about deadly lovers” to an otherwise incriminating collection of data can paint an entirely different picture than would
otherwise be presented.
A second aspect of the producer’s duty that indicates that she is
providing a testimonial statement results from the solemnity of her
statement. When deciding what data to include in a reply to the government, the producer likely considers the legal implications of the data
provided. 250 By determining what data is required to comply with a government request, where noncompliance can result in being held in contempt of court, 251 the producer would seem to meet the formality and solemnity requirement sought by Justice Thomas. 252 The producer
“gather[s] the information, carefully and accurately.” 253 This is evidence
that the producer is providing a solemn declaration of fact, with due care
taken to ensure that the data is accurate.
After the producer decides what data to provide to the government,
the data is then “sent to [i]nvestigators along with a [c]ertificate of
[a]uthenticity.” 254 This tracks almost exactly with Melendez-Diaz, where
the lab report was sworn before a notary, and Bullcoming, where the report was accompanied with a certificate of analysis. 255 The analyst who
248
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prepares this certificate, just like the swearing and certifying analysts in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, is certifying that the data was collected
and transmitted correctly. The specific analyst who prepared the certificate must therefore be available for confrontation under the Bullcoming
framework. 256
Lastly, Google designates a “custodian of records” who is able to
travel and appear in court to verify the data. 257 Because the custodian also certifies the validity of the data, 258 the defendant must also have the
ability to confront her. Although Google may want to streamline the
process and have a single custodian handle all trial proceedings, the custodian alone is not enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. While the
custodian can speak to her own certification of the data and may be able
to “vouch” for the reliability of the testimonial statements provided by
the producer and certifying analyst, Bullcoming requires the availability
of the specific individuals responsible for providing testimonial statements. 259 Because both the certifying analyst and the producer supply
testimonial statements, both must be available for confrontation despite
any additional testimony that the custodian may provide.
CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment places an important check on the use of big data obtained through government surveillance. The clause is well suited to address the issues of widespread
government surveillance, because its flexibility allows data to be used to
prevent emergencies, while simultaneously ensuring that incriminating
data is handled in accordance with the constitutional safeguards that the
Founders provided over two hundred years ago. Though big data was
perhaps unimaginable at the time of the Framing, the probativeness of a
testimonial statement was well understood. 260
When companies transfer data to government investigators under the
procedures detailed above, they provide testimonial statements. In order
to protect the accused from unscrupulous witnesses and human mistakes,
the Constitution requires the Sixth Amendment to play a role in the
transfer of big data into the hands of government investigators.
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